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Abstrat:
This paper presents a theoretial model of onit between two players, with inter-
vention by a peaekeeping fore. Peaekeepers are treated as a military ontingent,
apable of taking sides, ating as a third (independent) side in the war, or remaining
inative, depending on irumstanes. This departs from previous models, in whih
peaekeeping was no more than a parameter aeting players' ghting osts. The
main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peaekeepers, detailing the nature
and level of intervention required under dierent irumstanes; a strategy whih
results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The red-
ible threat of fore (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key omponent.
Keywords: Peaekeeping, onit, responsibility to protet (R2P).
JEL lassiation: D74, F53, H56.
1 Introdution
United Nations peaekeeping missions have existed sine 1948.
1
Over the years there
have been lose to seventy, of whih sixteen are still urrently ative at the time of
writing. Most of those who have examined the UN's peaekeeping reord reognize
that although some of these missions have sueeded in bringing peae to onit
areas, many others have failed (Durh, 1996; Diehl, 2008; Evans, 2008; to name just
a few).
During this time, the nature of war, and therefore the demands made on peae-
keepers, hanged. As Dallaire (2003) writes:
During the Cold War, peaekeeping missions generally monitored the imple-
mentation of peae agreements and prevented isolated inidents from leading
to a resumption of onit. In the nineties the fous shifted: the mission aim
was to bring about a form of order, whether it be a system of humanitarian
relief or an agreement fored on warring fations.
But despite this hange the guiding priniples of UN peaekeeping missions have
remained the same: only intervene if all parties agree; remain impartial; and only use
fore for self-defene. These priniples are often seen as limitations of peaekeeping
missions, perhaps the reason for the failure of some of them.
UN eld ommanders have omplained of the rippling restritions of their man-
dates (Makenzie, 1993; Dallaire, 2003). After his tour in Sarajevo, Makenzie was
asked what ould be done about Bosnia. His reply was, Stop the war. But you
an't do that militarily without killing a lot of people, inluding your own.
In this paper I imagine a peaekeeping fore whih has omplete leeway as to its
mode of intervention. It an ght on one side of the onit against the other; it
an ght both sides at one; it an simply stand aside. If given suh latitude, what
would be the optimal strategy for suh a fore if its goal is to redue the intensity of
the onit, as measured by the ombined levels of armament by both adversaries?
Peaekeepers in the model have the advantage of being able to size up the fores
of the two adversaries in the onit before going into ombat themselves, and the
disadvantage of limited resoures. Under these onditions, I onsider two fairly
intuitive strategies that might ome to mind. The rst is full deployment, in whih
the peaekeeping fore enters the onit as a third side in an eort to deter the
others. This is shown to be eetive only when the peaekeeping fore is very large.
The seond is referred to as underdog deployment and onsists of ghting on the
weaker side, no matter what the sizes of the two armies are. This strategy has
ambiguous results, as no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the ensuing onit
situation between the two adversaries.
1
The term peaekeeping is used here in the olloquial sense of any third-party fore sent to a
onit area with the aim of reduing the intensity of warfare. Stritly speaking, the term peae
operations is more appropriate, but less reognizable to most audienes. For a taxonomy of the
various kinds of peae operations (of whih traditional peaekeeping is one) see Diehl (2008).
2
I onsider a third strategy, alled strategi deployment, whih is a variant of the
seond, but requires a minimum level of armament by at least one side in the onit
before peaekeepers are atually alled into play. In terms of reduing the intensity
of the onit (i.e. the ombined levels of armament on both sides) this strategy is
optimal. Not only does it perform better than the previous two, it performs better
than any other strategy one ould oneive of, as is mathematially shown.
Strategi deployment has the added advantage that it is agreeable to the adver-
saries themselves. Indeed, their payos under strategi deployment are higher than
under any other mode of intervention. This ours beause strategi deployment pre-
vents them from devoting too many resoures to the onit, whih is an essentially
wasteful ativity.
In strategi deployment, it is the threat of intervention whih makes the adver-
saries ondut themselves in the manner desired. In equilibrium, the peaekeepers
do not atually ght. This is, of ourse, another deided advantage of this strategy.
Strategies are prediated on the peaekeeping fore announing, before any on-
it begins, how it will reat when a onit does arise. The announement must be
heard and believed by all potential belligerents. Thus the announement must be a
redible ommitment.
2
So under strategi deployment, even though peaekeepers do
not atually ght in equilibrium, they must be prepared to ght if one of the adver-
saries deviates from his equilibrium behavior. This will ensure that the peaekeeping
authority's redibility is maintained for future onit situations.
1.1 Related literature
Regan (1996) onduted an empirial study of third-party interventions, and arrived
at the onlusion that some ombination of military and eonomi poliies ahieves
best results. He does not present a theoretial model, but does provide a suggestion
to theorists interested in the topi: The key to any intervention strategy is to alter
the alulations by whih the antagonists arrive at partiular outomes."
Siqueira (2003) provides a simple onit model in whih a third party is apable
of altering the ombatants' ost parameters; that is to say, the third party an
make it more or less expensive for ombatants to wage war. But sine ombatants
simply take these parameters as given, there is in fat very little by way of strategi
interation between ombatants and the third party.
In Chang, Potter and Sanders (2007), the third party is an ally of one of the
ombatants. It makes a money transfer to the side it favors, and it does this prior to
the onit. The two sides in the onit take this behavior as given, as in Siqueira
(2003); to them it is simply a matter of the parameters having hanged.
2
This issue of redible ommitment is resolved by imagining that the onit is one of a series
of onits (or potential onits) spread out over an innite time-horizon. Then, as is well known
from the literature on innitely-repeated games, the peaekeeping authority has an inentive to
honor its ommitments, i.e. make good on its promises and threats, if it is to be believed in the
future.
3
In these two papers, the third party's ations are not ontingent on the ations
taken by the ombatants. This allows the two sides in the onit to go all out, in
a sense: their parameters may have been inuened by the third party, but they do
not fear any future onsequenes of their ations. They are the last players to move.
In Gershenson (2002), by ontrast, the third party imposes a santion on the
winner of the onit, thereby reduing the inentive to win. This is of ourse an
eonomi measure, and not a military one.
Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) atually allow the third party (in one part of
the paper) to intervene as a ombatant. It hooses its level of eort at the same
time as the belligerents hoose theirs. This has interesting eets: in equilibrium,
we may see one (but not both) of the original warring fations lay down its arms, if
it is omparatively week. However, the third party is always a third ombatant, i.e.
never takes sides, as it does in this model.
See Solomon (2007) for a review of some of the earlier literature on the topi.
2 The model
The ontext of the model is a ivil onit opposing two groups. For simpliity, the
deision-maker at the head of eah group will be alled a warlord. Both warlords
attah the same value R to vitory; this an be land, power, a resoure, or all of
these. Eah warlord's problem is to deide on the level of fore to deploy in the
onit, knowing that fore is ostly. Here fore an mean a level of eort or a
number of soldiers or guns. At any rate it will be represented by a single number Gi
for eah warlord: warlord 1 hooses G
1
and warlord 2 hooses G
2
.
A standard way of modeling the outome of suh a onit is to use a ontest su-
ess funtion. I will use its simplest form, aording to whih warlord i's probability
of vitory (or his share of the prize) is
Pi =
Gi
G
1
+G
2
, (1)
assuming the two warlords' fores are the only ones to take the eld. If G
1
= G
2
= 0,
it is assumed that P1 = P2 = 1/2. That is to say, if peae prevails, the outome
is a draw. Contest suess funtions were pioneered by Tullok (1980) and further
analysed by Hirshleifer (1988, 1991); see Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007) for an
overview of the several variations ommonly used.
3
The warlord's expeted gain is PiR. From this one must subtrat his osts Ci(Gi).
His payo is therefore
3
For example, parameters ould be added to the form above to reate an asymmetry in the
onit: thus even if G
1
= G
2
, one side would have a greater hane than the other of winning.
This might be the ase if an established government is ghting a rebel group. The present model
ould be adapted for this ase; alulations would be more involved, but the qualitative nature of
the results would be unhanged.
4
pii = PiR−Ci(Gi) . (2)
This is what eah warlord tries to maximize. An equilibrium is found when G
1
maximizes pi
1
taking G
2
as given and, simultaneously, G
2
maximizes pi
2
taking G
1
as given.
In this model, the simple (and fairly standard) unit-ost form will be used:
Ci(Gi) = Gi . (3)
It has no parameters whih an be manipulated by peaekeepers.
Peaekeepers will at as an additional military fore, ghting either on warlord
1's side, on warlord 2's side, or as an adversary to both. I will all GP
1
any peae-
keeping fore deployed to assist warlord 1, GP
2
any that assists warlord 2, and GP
3
any that ats independently and ghts both warlords at the same time. Of the three
quantities GP
1
, GP
2
and GP
3
, at most one an be positive; the other two must be zero,
otherwise peaekeepers would be ghting eah other.
4
Possibly all three will be zero,
if peaekeepers hoose not to partiipate in the onit.
The deployment of peaekeepers aets the ontest suess funtion. Now war-
lord i's probability of winning is
Pi =
Gi +G
P
i
G
1
+G
2
+GP
, (4)
where GP ≡ GP
1
+GP
2
+GP
3
. Again, in the absene of any military strength (all the
Gs equal to 0), a draw is assumed (P1 = P2 = 1/2).
Tehnially equation (4) implies that the peaekeepers also have a probability of
winning the onit. This idea will not be dealt with formally: the peaekeeping
objetive is not to win, but to make it harder for the others to win, and so ompel
them to ght less. Although there is no aepted measure of the intensity of onit,
it will be adequate here to say that the third party's goal is to minimize G
1
+G
2
.
When sending peaekeeping fores to ombat zones, third parties often have
limited resoures at their ommand. For this reason I assume there is an upper
bound K to the fore GP whih an be mobilized. Another possible interpretation of
K is that it is the size of a mission sent to a onit area but not deployed right away.
Peaekeepers then deide whih part of the K troops at their disposal to engage in
ombat under what irumstanes.
The hoie of GP and its ghting orientation (i.e. whether it ghts on one
side or ats independently) is made after observing G
1
and G
2
. This is the the
third party's rule of engagement (ROE), and is announed at the beginning of the
game. Mathematially a rule of engagement is a funtion h : IR2 → IR3 whih takes
4
This is just ommon sense. The assumption is not mathematially neessary for the results.
5
as arguments the warlords' hoies (G
1
, G
2
) and returns the third party's hoie
(GP
1
, GP
2
, GP
3
).
The preise timing of the game is as follows:
1. the third party announes its ROE;
2. the warlords hoose their fores (G
1
and G
2
);
3. the third party deploys (GP
1
, GP
2
, GP
3
) aording to the ROE announed earlier;
4. war is waged.
In this ontext an equilibrium is dened as a pair (G∗
1
, G∗
2
) and an ROE suh that
eah warlord's hoie of G∗
i
maximizes his payo given the other warlord's hoie and
the ROE; while the ROE is the rule whih minimizes G∗
1
+G∗
2
.
For the sake of time-onsisteny, I assume that peaekeepers, one their ROE is
announed, are ommitted to enforing it. That is, they do not announe one ROE,
then hange their minds about it one the two warlords have hosen G
1
and G
2
. This
is ertainly justiable if we take a long-term view, in whih the situation desribed in
this model ours again and again. When a game is repeated indenitely, players who
want to be believed in the future must honor their promises in the present. Although
I do not model this expliitly, I have in mind a situation where peaekeepers do value
their future redibility enough to warrant this behavior.
In what follows, I will examine the model's equilibrium properties under three
dierent ROEs. The rst ROE is what I all full deployment, in whih the entire
peaekeeping mission K is deployed as an independent fore (i.e. not aliated with
either side) whenever hostilities take plae. In the seond ROE, whih I all underdog
deployment, peaekeepers help the weaker adversary, i.e. the one who has hosen the
lower armed strength, whenever there are hostilities. The third ROE is a variation
of the seond, with the qualiation that no peaekeepers are deployed if both G
1
and G
2
are suiently low. I will show that the third ROE, whih I all strategi
deployment, is optimal in induing warlords to keep hostilities to a minimum.
2.1 Full deployment
Under full deployment, the entire fore K is sent into ombat as a third ontender
whenever either warlord arms himself:
5
(GP
1
, GP
2
, GP
3
) =
{
(0, 0, 0) if G
1
= G
2
= 0 ;
(0, 0,K) otherwise.
(5)
Eah warlord hooses Gi to maximize
5
It seems natural to set GP = 0 whenever G
1
= G
2
= 0 in any rule of engagement. First, the
idea of keeping the peae (i.e. GP > 0) when no hostilities are imminent is awkward. Seond, it
makes possible P1 = P2 = 1/2 in a ontext of peae.
6
pii =
[
Gi
G
1
+G
2
+K
]
R−Gi , (6)
taking the other warlord's strength as given. Optimality onditions are found by
taking the derivatives ∂pi
1
/∂G
1
and ∂pi
2
/∂G
2
and setting them to zero. Solving
these onditions then yields the solution
G
1
= G
2
=
R− 4K +√R2 + 8KR
8
≡ GF . (7)
This is the equilibrium as long as GF is not negative, whih means as long as K ≤ R.
If K > R then peae, i.e. G
1
= G
2
= 0, is the equilibrium. Note that K > R is a
massive fore, probably quite unrealisti.
However, there is a range of values of K for whih two equilibria exist, one
of whih is peae. The minimum level of K whih allows (rather than ensures) a
peaeful equilibrium is found as follows. Suppose G
2
= 0. Warlord 1, if he also
hooses G
1
= 0, an get a payo of R/2: this is the payo of peae. If, however, he
deides to arm himself, he will fae a peaekeeping fore of K and his payo will be
pi
1
=
[
G
1
G
1
+K
]
R−G
1
. (8)
The maximum this an be is pi
1
= R +K − 2√KR; this an be found by straight-
forward optimization. As long as this is less than or equal to R/2, then G
1
= 0 is
optimal for warlord 1. That requires
K ≥ αR , (9)
where α ≡ (1 −√2/2)2. The same logi applies to warlord 2; therefore if (9) holds,
G
1
= G
2
= 0 is an equilibrium.
So when αR ≤ K < R, there are two equilbria: G
1
= G
2
= GF is one and
G
1
= G
2
= 0 is the other. If one warlord has strength GF , it is optimal for the
other to aquire the same strength; but if one is unarmed, then remaining unarmed
is optimal for the other.
6
The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The graph shows
equilibrium values of G
1
and G
2
for various levels ofK. The downward-sloping urve
shows equilibria where G
1
= G
2
= GF , as given by equation (7). We an see that for
any K > 0 the level of armament hosen by eah warlord is less than R/4, the level
hosen when there is no intervention. The thik line segment along the horizontal
axis shows the peaeful equilibria, where G
1
= G
2
= 0.
If there were no limit onK, the size of a peaekeeping fore to be sent to a onit
area, then there would be no problem maintaining peae. But third parties may not
6
When K = R, both are equivalent, sine GF = 0.
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K
G
1
, G
2
0
R/4
αR R
Figure 1. Equilibria under full deployment. When
αR ≤ K < R, two equilibria exist, one of whih is
peae.
have enough money to nane large-sale operations, or they may not have enough
soldiers. Sometimes there are several areas experiening onit onurrently, eah
one a worthy andidate for involvement. The question arises, then, how best to use
a limited fore, a relatively small level of K. Is there a way to obtain better results
than those of full deployment?
2.2 Underdog deployment
One possibility is to ome to the assistane of whihever side has hosen the lower
level of armament, if one is indeed lower than the other. The plan might be
(GP
1
, GP
2
, GP
3
) =


(K, 0, 0) if G
2
> G
1
;
(0,K, 0) if G
1
> G
2
;
(0, 0, 0) if G
1
= G
2
.
(10)
With suh a plan, the payo funtions pi
1
and pi
2
have a disontinuity at G
1
= G
2
;
nding equilibrium hoies is less straightforward.
If K is large enough, then this plan is quite suessful, as then G
1
= G
2
= 0
in equilibrium. To see that this is an equilibrium, suppose that warlord 2 hooses
G
2
= 0. If warlord 1 hooses G
2
= 0 he will get R/2. If instead he hooses G
1
> 0
he must ght all K peaekeepers; his maximum payo in that ase an be alulated
as pi = R+K−2√KR, just as under the full-deployment ROE. As long as K ≥ αR,
hoosing G
1
= 0 yields the higher payo. The same argument holds for warlord 2.
If K < αR, however, the peaeful situation G
1
= G
2
= 0 annot be sustained as
an equilibrium under this ROE. At least one warlord would have an inentive to raise
an army. In fat there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in this ase. I will not show
this formally, but only give an outline of the reasoning. Essentially, any situation
G
1
= G
2
> 0 fails as an equilibrium, sine eah warlord would wish to derease
8
his army slightly in order to attrat all peaekeepers to his side. An asymmetri
situation G
1
< G
2
also fails as an equilibirum: either warlord 1 would want to
inrease G
1
or warlord 2 would want to derease G
2
, or both. Similarly, G
2
< G
1
will not work.
If K < αR, a mixed-strategy equilibrium may exist. This would have the draw-
bak that G
1
and G
2
ould not be predited by anyone with ertainty. The main
result, whih follows presently, is an ROE whih always yields a pure-strategy equi-
librium, and whih guarantees minimal reruitment: no other plan produes a lower
value of G
1
+G
2
.
2.3 Strategi deployment: the optimal plan
Under strategi deployment, the third party sets a limit M on G
1
and G
2
. If either
warlord gains an advantage over the other by exeeding this limit, the third party
ommits all its troops to assist the weaker side; if neither warlord exeeds the limit,
or if the two are equally mathed, the third party stays out of the onit. Hene
(GP
1
, GP
2
, GP
3
) =


(K, 0, 0) if G
2
> max{G
1
,M} ;
(0,K, 0) if G
1
> max{G
2
,M} ;
(0, 0, 0) otherwise;
(11)
where M ≡ max
{
0 ,
R− 2K − 2√2KR
4
}
. (12)
Note that M = 0 when K ≥ αR, where α was dened right after equation (9).
This plan is illustrated in Figure 2. It is designed to indue the warlords to
hoose G
1
= G
2
= M , whih they do in equilibrium, as will be shown. Total
reruitment in equilibrium is therefore G
1
+G
2
= 2M . Warlords' ombined payos
are pi
1
+ pi
2
= R− 2M . In Propositions 2 and 3 we show that no equilibrium has a
smaller value of G
1
+G
2
or higher ombined payos for the warlords.
The quantity M is onstruted as the smallest military strength whih makes
the warlords willing to onform to suh a plan. If it were any smaller, one of the
warlords would want to deviate by hoosing a level of strength well above M , even
though this would result in the deployment of all K peaekeeping troops against
him.
Let us see rst of all why G
1
= G
2
= M is an equilibrium when the ROE is given
by (11) and (12). Suppose warlord 2 sets G
2
= M . If warlord 1 does the same, his
payo will be R/2 −M . Can this be improved upon? If he hooses G
1
< M his
payo will be
pi
1
=
[
G
1
G
1
+M
]
R−G
1
. (13)
9
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G
1
G
2
all PK troops
help side 1
all PK troops
help side 2
no
ation
0
M
M
Figure 2. Strategi deployment. The third party
helps one side or the other, or neither, depending on
G
1
and G
2
. PK stands for peaekeeping.
This is inreasing in G
1
from 0 all the way to M , so no level in this range an do
better than G
1
= M . If he hooses G
1
> M , his payo will be
pi
1
=
[
G
1
+M
G
1
+M +K
]
R−G
1
. (14)
This is onave in G
1
, and reahes a maximum at G
1
=
√
(K +M)R − (K +M).
If K ≤ αR, the payo for that level of G
1
is equal to R/2−M , the same as he gets
by hoosing G
1
= M ; if K > αR, it is less. Therefore G
1
= M is optimal. And
sine the same logi an be used for warlord 2, we may onlude that G
1
= M and
G
2
= M are mutually optimal under this ROE.
Moreover, there are no other equilibria under this ROE. This is formalized as
Proposition 1. Under strategi deployment, the only equilibrium is G
1
= G
2
= M .
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 3 shows equilibrium values of G
1
and G
2
for dierent levels of K; in all
equilibria G
1
= G
2
. The thik urve shows equilibria under strategi deployment.
Along the downward-sloping part we have G
1
= G
2
= M ; the at part shows
peaeful equilibria. The thin urve is reprodued from the full-deployment diagram
for omparison. We an see that strategi deployment performs better than full
deployment when 0 < K < αR. When αR ≤ K < R, peae is the only equilibrium
under strategi deployment, whereas it is one of two possible equilibria under full
deployment.
Strategi deployment learly performs better than full deployment, in terms of
reduing the sale of warfare, as measured by G
1
+ G
2
. But there are many pos-
sible ROEs, and it is impossible to ompare strategi deployment to eah in turn.
The following proposition, however, establishes that none an perform better than
strategi deployment as it has been dened here.
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Figure 3. Equilibria under strategi deployment. For
0 < K < αR, strategi deployment performs better
than full deployment. When K ≥ αR, peae is the
unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In all equilibria, G
1
+G
2
≥ 2M . In other words, strategi deploy-
ment is the ROE whih minimizes G
1
+G
2
.
Proof. See appendix.
Strategi deployment, then, would ertainly suit peaekeepers. There remains to
see if the adversaries in the onit would appreiate this sort of intervention. The
next result shows that they would.
Proposition 3. In all equilibria, pi
1
+ pi
2
≤ R − 2M . In other words, strategi
deployment is the ROE whih maximizes ombined warlord payos.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind this result is rather simple. Conit (a form of rent-seeking)
is an ativity where individual optimization does not lead to a soially eient out-
ome. There are signiant negative externalities. By induing warlords to ommit
fewer resoures to ghting, peaekeepers allow them to onsume more.
3 Conlusion
Clearly this model does not ontain everything that must be onsidered when mount-
ing a peaekeeping initiative. Though it unfolds in stages, it does not take into a-
ount the full dynamis of onit (initiation, esalation, and so on). Its protagonists
are perfetly informed and make old, alulated deisions.
The model's main goal is to highlight the importane of the threat value of
peaekeeping fores. If peaekeepers make their deployment deisions based on the
levels of armament on both sides of a onit  and if both sides know this  then
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they (the peaekeepers) an inuene the sale of ghting in the right diretion. If
not, then their inuene is minimized, and an opportunity is wasted.
In this instane the threat of fore is more powerful than fore itself. By threaten-
ing to use its full fore K, rather than deploying it outright, the third party manages
to redue the sale of onit (G
1
+ G
2
). And in equilibrium, sine the warlords
omply with the limits set by the third party, peaekeepers do not even have to
partiipate in the onit (GP = 0).
This model somewhat parallels Blouin and Pallage (2008) [BP for short℄, a paper
on the delivery of humanitarian aid to areas undergoing ivil onit. In BP, the
analog of an ROE is a delivery plan for the aid whih needs to be delivered: so muh
through one warlord's area, so muh through the other's, depending on the sizes
of their armies. Underdog deployment has its ounterpart in BP, as does strategi
deployment, the optimal plan. These similarities are neither ontrived nor oini-
dental. Both aid and peaekeeping are forms of third-party intervention. Aid, muh
of whih is looted along the way to its intended reipients, ats as a transfer to one
side or the other in a onit. Its delivery through one area aets all those within,
inluding the warlord and his militia. Changing an aid delivery plan will be felt as a
gain by some and as a loss by others. The issue is substantial, sine aid onstitutes
a large fration of some ountries' inome, and the fration that is looted by militias
is rather staggering. Somalia has been a ase in point.
Peaekeeping, depending on its mode of deployment, also has its arrot-and-stik
properties. No warlord, if thinking rationally, wants an extra adversary. But he
would welome an ally. A peaekeeping fore, beause it an at as ally or adversary
to either side in a onit, an have a large impat on the outome, not through
atual ghting, but by making very lear how and under what irumstanes it will
ght.
Adopting strategi deployment (or anything lose to it) as a guiding priniple
would require a omplete hange of attitude on the part of the United Nations. The
UN Department of Peaekeeping Operations urrently operates on the basis of three
broad priniples, outlined in a doument ommonly known as the Capstone Dotrine
(United Nations, 2005). First, onsent of the parties involved in the onit is
required if any intervention is to take plae. Seond, impartiality is to be maintained
throughout the peaekeeping operation. Third, peaekeepers are not allowed to use
fore exept in self-defene and defene of the mandate. In terms of the model in this
paper, the seond priniple means GP
1
= GP
2
= 0, and the rst priniple probably
means GP
3
= 0 as well. Thus any kind of intervention suh as what is onsidered
here would not be approved.
But the UN seems willing to put aside these priniples under some irumstanes.
Gareth Evans points out that in the 1990s alone there were nine third-party inter-
ventions in state onits whih were both humanitarian and oerive. Most either
involved UN troops or operated with the approval of the UN Seurity Counil (Evans,
2008).
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Evans was one of the o-founders of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whih spearheaded the Responsibility to Protet (or
R2P) initiative in its 2001 report. A few years later, R2P was one of the entral
themes of the UN's 2005 World Summit Outome. It also has three priniples.
First, states must protet their own populations from mass atroities. Seond, the
international ommunity has a responsibility to help states do this. And third, if
states fail to do this, the international ommunity should intervene through oerive
measures suh as eonomi santions and (as a last resort) military involvement.
It is preisely when one side in a onit signiantly outnumbers the other
(G
1
> G
2
) and mobilizes a substantial fore (G
1
> M) that mass atroities are
likely to take plae. And it is in those instanes that strategi deployment presribes
military intervention. So there is denite ongruity between the model's presriptions
and the goals of R2P.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
For simpliity I deal only with pure strategies in this proof. The proof an be
generalized to mixed strategies as well. Assume throughout that the ROE is given
by equations (11) and (12).
The funtion pi
1
has a disontinuity at G
1
= max{G
2
,M} and an endpoint at
G
1
= 0, but everywhere else it is ontinuous and onave. So any equilibrium in
whih 0 < G
1
6= max{G
2
,M} requires that the rst-order ondition ∂pi
1
/∂G
1
= 0
be satised, to ensure that warlord 1 annot inrease his payo by making a slight
hange toG
1
in either diretion. And of ourse, any equilibrium requires that warlord
1 be unable to inrease his payo by hanging G
1
to any other level, suh as M or
a level slightly below G
2
. Naturally the foregoing also applies to G
2
.
First, suppose G
1
= 0 < M . Warlord 2 an seure the entire prize at almost no
ost, by setting G
2
slightly above 0. Warlord 1 ends up with a zero payo, although
he ould get a positive payo by arming himself. This annot happen in equilibrium.
It follows that G
1
annot be zero in equilibrium if M is positive.
Now suppose that 0 < G
1
< G
2
≤M or that 0 < G
1
= G
2
< M . In either ase,
routine alulations show that the derivative ∂pi
1
/∂G
1
is neessarily positive. Yet it
has to be zero for equilibrium to hold.
Next, suppose that G
1
> max{G
2
,M} and that G
2
> 0. All peaekeepers ght
for side 2. This situation requires that both rst-order onditions ∂pi
1
/∂G
1
= 0 and
∂pi
2
/∂G
2
= 0 be met. Solving these onditions yields G
1
= R/4 and G
2
= (R/4)−K.
Warlord 1 obtains a payo of pi
1
= R/4, whih he an improve upon by setting G
1
just below G
2
if G
2
> M (making all peaekeepers ght for him) or by setting
G
1
= M if G
2
≤ M (making peaekeepers stay out of the ght). So the situation
annot be an equilibrium.
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Finally suppose that G
1
= G
2
> M . In this ase peaekeepers take no ation.
Warlord 1's payo is (R/2)−G
1
. He an get more than this by lowering G
1
slightly,
making all peaekeepers ght on his side. Hene this annot be an equilibrium.
Naturally the same arguments go through if we reverse warlords 1 and 2. That
exhausts all possibilities exept G
1
= G
2
= M . 2
B. Proof of Proposition 2
For simpliity we deal only with pure strategies in this proof. The proof an be
generalized to mixed strategies as well.
Consider an equilibrium where warlords' fores are G∗
1
and G∗
2
and where the
third party applies a ertain ROE  all it ROE*. Let pi∗
1
denote warlord 1's payo
in this equilibrium and let pi∗
2
denote warlord 2's. Now what would happen if warlord
1 deviated from this equilibrium? Speially, what would happen if warlord 2 played
G∗
2
but warlord 1 played G˜
1
≡
√
R(G∗
2
+K)−G∗
2
−K instead of G∗
1
(and the third
party applied ROE* as before)? Warlord 1's payo (whih I will all p˜i
1
) would be
p˜i
1
=
[
G˜
1
+ G˜P
1
G˜
1
+G∗
2
+ G˜P
]
R − G˜
1
; (15)
where G˜P
1
and G˜P are the third party's responses (under ROE*) to G˜
1
and G∗
2
.
Beause G˜P
1
≥ 0 and G˜P ≤ K, we have
p˜i
1
≥
[
G˜
1
G˜
1
+G∗
2
+K
]
R − G˜
1
. (16)
Substituting the denition of G˜
1
into (16), we get
p˜i
1
≥ R+K +G∗
2
− 2
√
R(G∗
2
+K) . (17)
Whatever the value of p˜i
1
, it annot be greater than pi∗
1
, beause pi∗
1
is the equilibrium
payo, i.e. the highest payo that warlord 1 an ahieve when warlord 2 plays G∗
2
and the peaekeepers apply ROE*. So pi∗
1
≥ p˜i
1
, and as a result
pi∗
1
≥ R+K +G∗
2
− 2
√
R(G∗
2
+K) . (18)
Repeating this exerise for warlord 2 yields
pi∗
2
≥ R+K +G∗
1
− 2
√
R(G∗
1
+K) . (19)
Adding (18) and (19) together gives us
pi∗ ≥ 2R+ 2K +G∗ − 2
[√
R(G∗
1
+K) +
√
R(G∗
2
+K)
]
, (20)
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where pi∗ ≡ pi∗
1
+ pi∗
2
and G∗ ≡ G∗
1
+G∗
2
. The quantity in brakets is no greater than√
2R(G∗ + 2K), sine for any numbers a and b the inequality
√
a+
√
b ≤√2(a+ b)
must hold; this is a standard result from geometry, and an example of the Cauhy-
Shwarz inequality. Also, total payo pi∗ an be no greater than R −G∗, the value
of the prize less military expenditures. These two observations allow us to write
R−G∗ ≥ pi∗ ≥ 2R+ 2K +G∗ − 2
√
2R(G∗ + 2K) , (21)
from whih it is fairly straightforward to show
G∗ ≥ R− 2K − 2
√
2KR
2
= 2M . (22)
This ompletes the proof. 2
C. Proof of Proposition 3
By denition we have
pi
1
+ pi
2
=
[
G
1
+G
2
+GP
1
+GP
2
G
1
+G
2
+GP
1
+GP
2
+GP
3
]
R− (G
1
+G
2
) . (23)
The fration in brakets is no greater than 1. The term in parentheses is at least
2M , by Proposition 2. Therefore the entire right-hand side of (23) is no greater than
R− 2M . 2
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